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The objectives of the current study are of two folds; dealing firstly with the 
commitment of the listed companies in reporting minority shareholders' 
information in their corporate annual report and secondly to determine the 
implication of such reporting practices towards shareholders activism in this 
country. It is implied in this study that if the reporting practices is fair and the 
level of shareholders activism is high, corporate governance practices could 
be significantly improved. 
The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) listing requirement specifically 
calls for the disclosure of shareholders information in the corporate annual 
reports. Basic shareholders information should include items such as names 
of major shareholder(s), the breakdown of shareholding or percentage of 
ownership, directors' direct and indirect shareholding. In line with the corporate 
governance's code of best practices and the need to protect minority 
shareholders, listed companies are also encouraged to disclose information 
on minority shareholders. 
Using secondary data (from annual reports) to achieve the first objective and 
primary data (through questionnaire surveys) for the second objective, the study 
found that information disclosure for majority shareholders is relatively 
satisfactory compared to those related to the minority shareholders. Very few 
listed companies are taking the initiative to include detailed minority shareholders 
information in their annual reports. On the same connotation, minority 
shareholders activism is also found to be low. Specifically, minority shareholders' 
participation at annual general meetings (AGM) is also found to be less 
satisfactory. As such, the shareholders were not found to have exercised their 
roles or rights effectively. In most cases, important decisions and policy-related 
matters are decided solely by companies' own management team. The current 
study suggests that regulatory bodies as well as related agencies must 
deliberately inform minority shareholders of their rights and how they can 
proactively influence companies' corporate governance practices. 
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Introduction 
In Malaysia, corporate governance issues had received great attention, 
particularly after the Asian financial crisis in late 1997. Companies' bad reporting 
practices and the assumed abuse of power were said to be the main reasons 
that had caused company shares to plunge and the whole market tumbled. 
The whole scenario were also said to have shaken investors' confidence on 
Malaysian capital market. The government, together with other regulatory 
bodies such as the KLSE and the Security Commission had taken steps to 
improve financial reporting, hence to restore public confidence. 
The formation of a high-level government sponsored Finance Committee in 
1997 had resulted in the establishment of two very important agencies: The 
Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) and its related codes 
were formed to inculcate good governance habits; The Minority Shareholders 
Watchdog Group (MSWG) on the other was formed to encourage shareholders 
activism and at the same time to protect minority shareholders. 
Despite these efforts, research evidences had shown that the financial reporting 
practices on shareholders activities of listed companies of many countries were 
still very minimal (e.g. Nuys, 1993; Strickland, Wiles and Zenner, 1996). 
Similarly, minority shareholders' participation is still very low (e.g. Smith,1996; 
Karpoff et. al; 1996; Short and Keasey, 1997). 
The current study examined the Malaysian listed companies and local minority 
shareholders. It is therefore hoped that the research findings could provide 
feedback in understanding the Malaysian market. Specific steps in disclosing 
minority shareholders information would be recommended. The root cause of 
shareholders inaction would be highlighted. Efforts would also be made to 
educate and encourage shareholders to participate in corporate annual general 
meetings. 
Research Objectives 
The main objectives of the study are to determine companies' corporate 
disclosure of minority shareholders information and to identify shareholders 
awareness of their roles and rights as shareholders. Specifically, the objectives 
are to identify: 
1. The companies' view on minority shareholders information as well as its 
transparency level of ownership structure. 
2. The level of shareholders knowledge of their roles and rights as 
shareholders and its importance. 
3. The attributes and reasons of shareholders' participation in the organization. 
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Literature Review 
Legislation Protection 
Having ownership in a corporation confer individual shareholders with legislative 
rights. In general these rights would protect shareholders interest. However, 
its applicability depends on shareholders discretion whether they are aware of 
such rights and exercise them wisely. The most important rights for shareholders 
are attending and voting at the annual general meeting. These basic rights are 
set to protect their interest. Shareholders must realize that their presence and 
active participation in the meeting should give them the opportunity to meet 
the company's management team and constructively discuss with them on 
issues related to the company. Further, they can actively participate with 
decision-making activities through their voting rights. 
As legal owners of the company, they (shareholders) are also given the authority 
to request and convene any meeting, if urgent matters arise and require 
immediate attention. With this, shareholders are further protected, and they 
must equip themselves with knowledge about procedures related to general 
meeting. Accordingly, these rights have granted shareholders an easier way to 
assess the performance of the management group. Therefore, it is very 
important that shareholders are aware of their basic rights in order to participate 
actively in the general meetings. 
Shareholders should also realize that they have the right to know how company's 
assets are managed. They must ensure that these assets are not being misused 
or misappropriated by directors, managers or few controlling shareholders. 
In fact, if directors' activities are disquieting, shareholders can use their voting 
power to remove them. The Company Act 1965 has also granted the 
shareholders the authority to assess company's memorandum and article of 
association. Consequently, shareholders could acquire knowledge on basic 
information of companies operation. Additionally, shareholders are given the 
right to access information related to company activities; hence it should be 
widely disseminated among the shareholders. 
In promoting good governance practices on shareholders, the KLSE issued 
its "Statement on Shareholders Information Disclosure" as stipulated by 
paragraph 9.25 (items 22 Appendix 9C of the KLSE Requirements). The 
statement requires listed companies to disclose at least four basic items: First, 
the disclosure of substantial shareholders names as well as its number of shares 
held; Second, the statement should detail out its "distribution schedules" showing 
the breakdown of shareholders in terms of ownership percentage. Effectively, 
in terms of percentage of ownership should be ranked in descending order. 
The third requirement is the disclosure on directors' shareholding, which include 
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both direct and indirect equity holding. The fourth disclosure involves the 
classification of each type of equity together with its respective voting rights. 
Though the KLSE requirements do not specify the disclosure requirements of 
minority shareholders' information, the listed companies should nevertheless 
volunteer such information to afford protection to minority shareholders on one 
hand and on the other to observe the spirit of the code of corporate governance 
more than mere letter of the law. 
Emergence of shareholders activism 
In Malaysia, shareholder activism is a very recent mechanism of corporate 
governance. Though their rights, roles and privileges are clearly spelt out in 
the Company Act, their activism and participation are only assumed, not 
enforced. With the increase awareness among the public on the need for 
listed companies to practice corporate governance aggressively, shareholders 
activism is now very much encouraged. Nevertheless, it is too early to expect 
significant results from this activity. However in other countries like the United 
Kingdom and the United States, shareholder activism has made both positive 
and negative impact on various issues: the firm performance, management 
turnover and governance issues. 
The earliest successful effect of shareholder activism is apparent from a case 
study on Honeywell Inc. (Nuys, 1993). This paper has analyzed proxy solicitation 
and organization restructuring which happened in 1989. Nuys (1993) reports 
that, it is the first time for the institutional and individual shareholders combined 
effort in sponsoring proxy initiative. Resulting from such proxy, there have 
been changes in the organization of Honeywell Inc. With such changes, it 
boosted the share price of the company, hence the firm's value is enhanced. 
The most significant element of this case study is the emerging role of individual 
shareholders. In this case, dissident individual shareholders have initiated 
such proxy and received full support from the institutional shareholders. 
They used and exercised their voting power in order to vote for the proposals. 
The study also acts as a base of institutional shareholders involvement in 
corporate governance. 
As a result, the channel of communication between shareholders and 
management showed a tremendous change. Traditionally, it is not common to 
get views from the shareholders. Thus, the United States' Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has responded to this issue and initiated new rule of 
shareholder communication. 
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Shareholders Proposals and Firms Value 
Honeywell's case study as reported in previous sub-section has suggested 
some positive effects of shareholders' activism on the firm's value. Similarly, 
the findings of other case study (e.g. Strickland, Wiles and Zenner; 1996) have 
led the same results. In their study, they examined the effect of negotiated 
agreement or proxy proposal sponsored by the United Shareholder Association 
(USA) on targeted firms' value. USA is an agency formed by the SEC with the 
specific purpose of protecting minority shareholders through proxy votes. The 
study found that there is a positive abnormal return on stock value for those 
sponsored firms. 
In the United States, this association (USA) provides a medium for small 
shareholders (individual or retail shareholders) to monitor management activities 
effectively. In other words, a small shareholder may monitor the management 
with less cost. At first stage, USA would negotiate with the targeted firm to 
change its governance structure in order to improve the firms' performance. 
However, if such negotiation turns up unsuccessfully, this association uses its 
members to sponsor proxy proposals. Their membership consists of both 
individual and institutional shareholders. 
Another literature by Smith (1996), also reported a positive activism result, 
whereby firms' value as well as the shareholders wealth had significantly 
improved. For example, in the case of one institutional activist, CalPERS, it 
was found that the company was able to increase its profit by $19 Million over 
the period of five years (1989-1993) as a result of shareholders activism. 
Contrarily, some other studies reported negative effects of shareholders activism 
on the firm's share values. One of the examples is a research done by Karpoff 
et. al (1996). It was reported in their study that most minority shareholders are 
short-term investors. As such they are not particularly keen on fundamental 
characteristics of the firms. Many are just interested to make "quick money" 
that result from speculating activities. Thus their participation or activism did 
not positively impact the stock value. 
Similarly, Wahal (1996) suggests that on average, shareholders activism by 
pension fund do not improve long term stock price performance of targeted 
firms as well as its accounting performance measures, such as operating and 
net income of the firms. His finding specifically indicates that shareholders' 
proposal initiatives do not show significant effect on the stock price or on the 
firms' performance. Its non-proxy proposal on the other hand showed a positive 
return of the stock price. 
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Conceptual Framework 
Basically the research framework stipulates that shareholders activism is high 
when shareholders are aware of their roles and rights. Such awareness, in 
turn can only be achieved when the shareholders and the companies 
deliberately practice two other activities respectively: whilst the shareholders 
are knowledgeable of their roles and rights, the companies are complying with 
the regulatory requirements. Figure 1 depicts the conceptual model of this 
study. 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
SHAREHOLDERS ACTIVSM 
t = 
SHAREHOLDERS AWARENESS 
OF ROLES AND RIGHTS: 
- Aware 
h^ 
COMPANIES'VIEW ON MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS INFORMATION: 
- significant 
not significat 
OWNERSHIP TRANSPARENCY 
LEVEL: 
- highly transparent 
- transparent 
- not transparent 
Research Design 
This study was designed in two stages. The first stage was to content-analyze 
secondary data in the form of company's annual reports. Then, in the second 
stage questionnaires were distributed to assess shareholders awareness of 
their roles and rights. The results from these two stages were further synthesized 
to achieve the objectives of the study. 
norant 
LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE ON 
COMPANY'S BACKGROUD AND 
SHAREHOLDERS ROLES AND 
RIGHTS: 
- High 
- Ignorant 
Low 
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Stage One 
As for Stage One, data from annual report are analyzed to establish reporting 
practices of companies regarding shareholders information. Listed companies 
are expected to satisfy specific rules under KLSE listing requirement of 
shareholders information. The work of Dallas and Bradley (2002), which was 
used, effectively by the Standards and Poors group is replicated in this study 
to measure the level of reporting regarding shareholders information by 
Malaysian companies. A two-tier measurement procedures was used: first to 
determine whether or not companies comply with the KLSE requirements. 
Second, the level of transparency that was established. 
Sample selection 
To content analyze the annual reports, a sample of 100 companies were taken 
from the Composite Index Counter of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. These 
companies were chosen from various industries namely property, trading and 
services, construction, financial services, and hotel industry. 
The actual contents of the "Statement on Shareholders Information Disclosure" 
were reviewed. Data like the breakdown of shareholding, identification of 
substantial shareholders, directors' direct and indirect shareholding are taken 
from the annual reports for the years 1999 and 2001. Year 2001 was particularly 
chosen because it was the year when the code of corporate governance and 
its compliance practices was first introduced. Though the statement is a 
mandatory requirement, inclusion of minority information is a voluntary 
compliance. The year 1999 was chosen for comparative purposes (pre and 
post studies). The sample companies were chosen from the companies which 
published annual reports for two years were available. 
The measurement procedures 
As mentioned in the previous section, all variables chosen in this study were 
based on the company's corporate governance practice introduced by Dallas 
and Bradley (2002). However, the measurement procedures and scoring 
practices are adopted differently in order to suit the local compliance practices. 
In this study, each company is given a rank according to its level of compliance 
with the highest score of five and the lowest of one. 
Prior to the award ranking of the individual company, an observation of a sample 
of the companies' annual report was conducted to obtain a general idea of the 
companies' disclosure practices. In complying to the KLSE requirements, 
listed companies are expected to disclose the list of substantial shareholders' 
names as well as its number and percentage of shares held in accordance to 
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the register of substantial shareholders. In addition, there should be a 
disclosure on the names of the 30 largest securities holders from each class 
of shares in the statement. 
Accordingly, a distribution schedule showing the breakdown of shareholders 
should also be addressed. Such requirement is stipulated clearly in the 
Corporate Governance Reporting Guideline. Management must ensure that, 
there is a statement or section on directors' shareholding, which indicates their 
direct and deemed interest in the annual report in accordance with the 
requirements of section 134 of the Company Act (1967). Last but not least, 
total number of holders of each class of equity together with voting rights 
attached to it must also be included. 
Each of these variables is carefully identified in terms of its disclosure practices 
as well as its conformance to company's corporate governance practices and 
hence KLSE listing requirement. In order to facilitate the analysis, a nominal 
number is assigned to indicate the compliance of each requirement. Each of 
the variables was examined in terms of its compliance with the company's 
corporate governance practices. If they comply, a ' 1 ' is assigned. A"0' indicates 
'non-compliance' and"2' shows 'not applicable'. A'not applicable' score is 
assigned when the variable is not relevant and cannot be included in the 
statement of shareholders information or elsewhere in the annual report. For 
example, if the directors are not holding shares in the company or subsidiaries 
it will be valued as '2'. 
The Ranking Procedures 
Each company would be ranked according to its transparency level. In doing 
so, apart from the conformance to the requirements of the Corporate 
Governance Practices and Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, the company's 
trend on corporate disclosure practices related to specific shareholders' 
information is also taken into account. This means that when ranking disclosure 
practices that apply to ownership structure, both factors viz. the trend on 
disclosure of shareholders information and conformance requirements are 
taken into consideration. 
The following are the procedures that should be adopted when ranking the 
transparency level of companies. As stated above, the ranking starts with the 
highest of five and the lowest of one. Ranking ' 1 ' connotes a "No Disclosure'. 
The company should be ranked in this manner when it does not disclose any 
of the variables, meaning that the particular company does not comply with 
the KLSE listing requirement and Dallas and Bradley's (2002) corporate 
governance compliance practices. 
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While ranking '2' refers as 'Disclosure With Justification'. This ranking shows 
that the company is seen to have adhered to the KLSE listing requirement, 
but does not include a schedule of each class of securities. Ranking '3' which 
is called as 'Disclosure with Justification and Beyond Requirement' is quite 
similar with ranking '2', but the statement consists of extra information such 
as the nationality of shareholders, location of shareholders and the director 
shareholding. 
Ranking '4' refers to 'Disclosure With Explanation'. According to this ranking, 
the company includes all information required under the KLSE listing 
requirement in the statement of shareholders information except for the director 
shareholding disclosure. However, the director shareholding appears in the 
directors' report. 
The highest ranking, which is"5' referred as"Disclosure With and Beyond 
Requirement'. This means that, the company has fulfilled the KLSE listing 
requirement and further includes other information (voluntary in nature) like 
nationality of shareholders, location of shareholders, category of shareholders 
and minority holders. 
For analysis purposes, ranking '5' shows 'highly transparent', while ranking '4' 
indicated as 'transparent'. Since both are seen to conform to company's 
corporate governance practices (Dallas and Bradley, 2002) and hence, KLSE 
Listing Requirements. The difference between the two ranks ('5' and"4') is 
the disclosure presentation of the director shareholding (direct and indirect). 
Ranking 3 constitutes as 'medium transparent' and ranking 2 as 'generally 
transparent' and finally ranking'"!' as 'not transparent at all'. 
Stage Two 
For the second stage, questionnaires were formulated based on two basic phases. 
In the first phase, questions are developed based on previous related studies. 
When the initial draft was completed, the questions were thoroughly discussed 
by the researchers. Then, in the second phase, the questionnaire was further 
reviewed by consultant officer from the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group 
(MSWG). This phase was particularly important to ensure the practicality of the 
questionnaire and the suitability of the questionnaire wordings. 
Sample selection 
The sample selection consisted of 250 individuals or retail investors. Most of 
these shareholders were from the Klang Valley area. Names were obtained 
mainly from securities firms, companies offering Employee Share Option 
Scheme (ESOS) and other individual investors. 
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Data collection procedures 
This questionnaire was designed into various sections. The first section focused 
on demographic information. The second section looks for information on the 
respondents' knowledge level on companies' literature or background. Where 
as, in the third section respondents are asked to indicate the level of importance 
of each listed factor, which encourages them to attend companies' annual 
general meeting (AGM). The fourth section lists possible reasons for 
shareholders non-participation in companies' AGM. Finally, the last section 
provides comments and suggestions from individuals or institution shareholders 
on certain ways of improving shareholders activism in Malaysia. 
Distribution of Questionnaires 
All questionnaires are randomly distributed to the securities firms and any 
individual that have shares. In normal procedure, respondents are given two 
weeks to complete the questionnaires. When there is a late reply, a follow up 
call is necessary. In order to prevent loss, most of the questionnaires were 
self administered and distributed by hand directly to the individual investors. 
A contact person within the security firm was also identified to coordinate the 
distribution and the collection of questionnaires. 
Statistical Analysis Used 
For this study purposes, data from annual reports were content-analyzed and 
further transformed to make it possible to use descriptive analysis procedures. 
The survey results were analyzed using statistical software, SPSS version 
11.0. Descriptive statistical analysis, which includes frequency tabulation, 
means ranking and means analysis were applied for both data. 
Data Analysis, Findings And Discussions 
Once all data has been collected, analysis of the data is further explained as 
follows: 
Objective 1: Companies' view on minority shareholders information and 
ownership structure transparency level (Secondary Data Analysis) 
For the first objective, frequency tabulation and mean analysis were used to 
describe the findings. Out of the sample size of 100, only 87 companies' 
annual reports were available for years 1999 and 2001. 
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Table 1 : Companies' Compliance Report on Ownership Structure Information 
Variables 
Shareholding Breakdown 
- comply 
Substantial shareholder 
- comply 
Director shareholding (direct interest) 
- comply 
- not applicable 
Director Indirect Shareholding 
- comply 
- not applicable 
Other information - voluntary 
Frequency 
2001 
87 
87 
85 
2 
75 
12 
12 
% 
2001 
100 
100 
97.7 
2.3 
86.2 
13.8 
13.8 
Frequency 
1999 
87 
87 
84 
3 
75 
12 
6 
% 
1999 
100 
100 
96.6 
3.4 
86.2 
13.8 
6.9 
Based on the above table, all companies (87) reported their ownership structure 
in the annual report according to companies' corporate governance practices. 
The analytical procedures as suggested by Dallas and Bradley (2002) were 
accordingly replicated. Information on companies' shareholding breakdown 
and their substantial shareholders for both years was examined. In year 2001, 
85 annual reports had information on director shareholding (direct interest) 
and 2 companies reported that none of the director has any share in the 
company. While in year 1999, 84 companies had included the director 
shareholding (director interest) and 3 companies stated as not applicable. 
Out of the total, 75 companies reported on director indirect shareholding while, 
12 companies showed not applicable in both years. 
The above findings revealed that, all companies had complied with companies' 
corporate governance practices on ownership structure as well as KLSE listing 
requirements. This showed that, companies' ownership structure disclosure 
was at par with corporate governance disclosure practice requirements. Hence, 
it can be concluded that most companies had presented a good corporate 
governance disclosure practices specifically on ownership structure. 
Nevertheless, as evidenced by the findings, the majority of companies were 
seen lacking in reporting voluntary information in their analysis of shareholding 
statement. As explained earlier, voluntary reporting should include information 
on minority shareholding, category of shareholders and location of 
shareholders. Out of the total, only 12 companies were found to have 
voluntarily reported "other information" (voluntary information) in their analysis 
of the shareholding statement in year 2001. This is an increase from the year 
1999, when only six companies had voluntarily reported. 
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Ownership Structure and Transparency Level 
Based on the preliminary findings, most of the companies were awarded with 
either rank '4' or '5' and only a few with rank '3' or '2'. None from rank'T. 
Table 2 : Mean of companies' ranking for year 2001 and year 1999 
Year 
2001 
1999 
Mean 
4.5 
4.1 
Table 2 represents means of companies' ranking for years 2001 and 1999. In 
year 2001, 39 (44.8%) companies were awarded with rank"4', while another 
46 (52.9%) companies with rank '5'. However, 68 (78.2%) companies achieved 
rank '4' and 18 (20.7%) achieved rank '5' in year 1999. In this analysis, one 
organization (Sunway Holding Incorporated Berhad) qualified as disclosing 
"beyond requirement" information. Beside the normal information such as 
shareholders' nationality, location and category, the company had also reported 
its director's shareholding (direct and indirect interest) in a separate statement 
called director interest statement in its annual report. 
Based on the information presented in Table 2, it is evidenced that listed companies, 
had for both years acquired an average score of above '4', which implied a relatively 
high level of transparency. The year 2001 had shown a slightly better result. 
These findings revealed a significant impact and showed improvement on 
companies' disclosure practices of ownership structure in the respective years or 
particular year, and hence continue better in the future reporting. 
Companies' View on Minority Shareholders Information. 
There was a shifting trend of disclosure practices between the two years. In 
year 1999, 69 companies had disclosed director shareholding and indirect 
shareholding in the directors' report and only 3 companies had disclosed it in 
analysis of shareholding statement. Whereas in year 2001, only 35 companies 
disclosed director shareholding and indirect shareholding in the directors' report, 
while another 31 companies had disclosed it in the analysis of shareholding 
statement. Thus, these findings were consistent with the above ranking analysis. 
The most important voluntary information in this study is related to shareholders 
category. Usually, company would have a separate section on this information 
in the analysis of shareholders statement. Under this section, shareholders are 
categorized according to the individuality (retail investors), races (bumiputra 
and non-bumiputra), institutions and foreign. Out of 87 companies, only 5 
companies had seen to have shareholders category information and none was 
seen to have a separate section on minority shareholding alone. 
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Thus, this showed that most companies did not think of the importance of 
such disclosure (minority shareholding) in the annual report and thus, may 
imply that minority shareholders were not significant enough to be portrayed 
in the annual report. This finding revealed to be significant in this study. Even 
though in the previous analysis had shown improvement on disclosure 
practices, it did not actually reflect on minority shareholding disclosure. Hence, 
it revealed that most companies had not viewed minority shareholders 
information important to be included in the analysis of shareholding statement. 
Objective 2: Level of Investors' knowledge on companies' information and 
shareholders roles and rights. (Primary Data Analysis) 
Shareholders awareness of their roles and rights as shareholders 
Out of the total distribution of 250, only 80 completed questionnaires were 
returned. Since not all the questionnaires were received within the first two 
weeks after their initial distribution, a non-response bias test was conducted 
to ensure that no non-response bias existed in the study. According to Wallace 
and Cook (1990), there were several methods of adjusting for non-response 
bias, namely T-test, ANOVA and Cross tabulation. None of the respondents 
was categorized under "non-response bias". 
Demographic Information 
Table 3 : Respondents Analysis on Occupational Sector and Income. 
ELEMENTS 
Occupational Sector: 
- government 
- commercial 
- retired 
- business 
- self employed 
Annual Income: 
- > 100,000 
- 51-000-100,000 
- 20,000-50,000 
- < 20,000 
FREQUENCY 
10 
46 
2 
13 
9 
10 
16 
44 
8 
PERCENTAGE 
12.5 
57.5 
2.5 
16.3 
11.3 
12.5 
20 
55 
10 
Table 3 represents the demographic profiles of the respondents. Based on 
the table, the commercial sector contributed to the highest percentage of 
response rate, which was 57.5% (46) and followed by business sector with 
16.3% (13). Both the government sector and self-employed respondents' 
represented 12.5% (10) and 11.3% (1.3) respectively. Retirees were the lowest 
contributor of respondents, which was 2.5%(2). 
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Besides that, respondents earning annual income between RM20.000 to 
RM50.000 reflect the highest response rate (55% or 44 respondents). Then, 
those earning between RM51,000-RM100,000 contribute the second highest 
response rate, which was 20% (16). Finally, respondents earning more than 
RM 100,000 show 12.5% (10) response rate while 10% (8) are from respondents 
earning less than RM20,000. 
Table 4 : Respondents Information on Experience, AGM attendance 
and participation, voting rights and proxy forms 
VARIABLES 
Experience as Investor: 
- > 20 years 
- 6 - 1 0 years 
- 1 - 5 years 
- < 1 year 
AGM attendance: 
- 6 - 1 0 times 
- 1 - 5 times 
- Nil 
- Missing 
Participation in AGM:' 
- yes 
- no 
Voting Rights: 
- yes 
- no 
Return proxy form: 
- yes 
- no 
- missing 
FREQUENCY 
8 
30 
27 
15 
7 
10 
62 
1 
4 
76 
8 
72 
7 
71 
1 
PERCENTAGE 
10 
37.5 
33.8 
18.8 
8.8 
12.5 
77.5 
1.3 
5 
95 
10 
90 
8.8 
88.8 
2.5 
Table 4 shows that investors with experience between 6 -10 years were the 
majority of the respondents, which was 30 (37.5%). Another 27 (33.8) 
respondents were investors that had experience between 1 - 5 years. Then, 
another 15 respondents were investors with experience less than 1 year and 
finally 8 respondents were investors with more than 20 years. In general, it is 
portrayed that the respondents comprised mainly of minority shareholders with 
1 to 10 years experience. 
On a question related to attendance at annual general meetings, an astounding 
77.5% (62) of the total respondents indicated that they had not attended one. 
In terms of participation at the annual general meeting, again the majority of 
them (95% or 76 respondents) said "No". Ninety percent of the respondents 
(72) had never exercised their voting rights or return their proxy forms. It is 
very clear from these analysis that the minority shareholders adopted the "tidak 
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apa" or "couldn't be bothered" attitude. The implication is that, the investors 
did not see the importance of exercising their rights by attending and participating 
at annual general meetings. 
The negative attitude is indeed worrying, particularly when the respondents 
comprised of "prime candidates": those who were young, middle-class, 
energetic, knowledgeable and very experienced. Thus, it was expected that 
they could play an active part in the annual general meetings. If this 
phenomenon continues, the future of shareholders activism is indeed very bleak. 
Table 5 : Ranking of Investors' Knowledge on Companies' Background 
and Shareholders' Rights and Roles 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Variables 
Type of product or service 
Ownership structure 
Components of majority holders 
Financial transparency 
Shareholding breakdown 
Board of director profile 
Existence of block holders 
Relationship between block holders and company 
Role of corporate board 
Knowledge on indirect ownership 
Knowledge on voting control of director 
Role of minority shareholders 
Independence of director 
Policies on internal control 
Shareholders rights on cumulative voting 
Process of directors' election 
Component of board subcommittee 
AGM/EGM procedures 
Policies on directors' remuneration 
Policies on directors' nomination 
Appointment of advisors on minority shareholders 
Shareholders' rights on derivative action 
Shareholders attendance 
Mean 
3.65 
3.56 
3.55 
3.13 
3.11 
3.07 
3.00 
2.94 
2.81 
2.76 
2.73 
2.68 
2.68 
2.60 
2.57 
2.56 
2.54 
2.51 
2.48 
2.48 
2.48 
2.46 
2.44 
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Table 5 shows the means scores of investors' knowledge of companies' 
literature as well as their perceived roles and rights. Generally, the respondents 
were in the category of either "don't care" or had a "low" level of knowledge of 
companies' information as well as their roles and rights. The average low 
scores of "between 2.7 and 3.5" for the items used to measure level of 
shareholders knowledge implied that they have very limited or no knowledge 
related to "ownership structure, components of majority shareholders, 
shareholding breakdown, existence of block holders, relationship between 
block holders and company, knowledge of indirect ownership and knowledge 
of voting control of directors". 
Specifically, minority shareholders' knowledge of "AGM-related items" such 
as AGM procedures, voting rights, voting procedures, policies on directors 
nomination, remuneration policy, process of directors election, role of corporate 
board, importance of attendance at AGM are very low (with scores less than 
3). Such low scores reflect the minority shareholders' opinions on their role. 
The high scores of 3.56 and 3.55 respectively for items "ownership structure" 
and "components of majority shareholders" imply a "less important" role of the 
minority investors. 
Though the secondary data analysis implied a satisfactory disclosure level of 
major shareholders information, disclosure practices for minority investors are 
still in its somewhat infancy age. This "lack of reporting" on the part of the 
listed companies is somehow translated or perceived by the minority 
shareholders as reflecting their level of importance within the organization. 
Whilst the majority shareholders are given all the attention, the minority 
shareholders are treated like "second-class citizens". If Malaysian listed 
companies are serious in promoting shareholders activism in this country, the 
reporting practices must be aggressively improved to safeguard the welfare 
of the minority shareholders. Information on minority shareholders, though 
voluntary in nature must be reported in the annual reports to signify its 
importance to the companies. 
Objective 3 : Factors that encourage and discourage investors to participate 
in the annual general meeting 
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Table 6 : Ranking of factors that might induce investors to 
participate in the meeting 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Variables 
Time availability 
Value added to me as an investor 
Knowledge on my right as a shareholder 
Agenda of the meeting 
Knowledge on issues to be addressed 
Investors suggestion 
Types of issues to be addressed 
Knowledge on the importance of AGM 
Place or venue of the meeting held 
Effectiveness of AGM administrator 
Proximity of the meeting place 
Overall benefits of attending AGM 
Accommodation 
Feeling of being welcome 
Handling of issues of previous AGM 
Free gift and promotion 
Components of board of directors 
Selection of food and delicacies 
Availability of proxies 
Mean 
3.81 
3.81 
3.79 
3.77 
3.71 
3.65 
3.65 
3.65 
3.56 
3.55 
3.54 
3.51 
3.50 
3.48 
3.39 
3.39 
3.29 
3.25 
3.15 
Table 6 shows a list of factors that would motivate investors to participate 
in the companies' meeting. Based on the table, the ranking were within 
the mean scores range of 3.15 and 3.81. Evidently, all the factors were in 
the range of "don't care". However, "time availability", "value added as 
investors", "knowledge of shareholders right", "agenda of meeting" and" 
"knowledge of issues to be addressed at the meeting" could be seen as five 
most important factors that may induce shareholders to participate actively in 
companies AGMs. 
Although findings revealed some factors that would encourage investors to 
attend and participate in the meeting, the overall average score was still low. 
It was within the range of 3.0 and 3.9. Consequently, this indicates that most 
investors are still not aware of the importance of attending the annual general 
meeting and its related benefits. 
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Table 7 : Ranking of reasons for not actively participating in 
the companies' annual general meeting 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Variables 
Shareholders equity is too small 
Minorities can't out vote dominant block holders 
Individual shareholder are not cohesive 
Time consuming 
The running of companies is BOD responsibilities 
AGM are held at time not suitable to my schedule 
Board of directors are very domineering 
Investing is just for 'quick money' rather than for 
long term investment 
Shareholders suggestion are not welcome 
Annual general meeting held is too long 
Previous suggestions are not accordingly implemented 
Benefit is uncertain 
Investing is not core business 
I'm not interested to participate in annual general meeting 
Too short a notice to attend 
Enjoy food and hotel 
Types of resolution are usually very mundane 
High activism cost 
Happy with current return on investment 
Present in the annual general meeting will make 
significant differences in the company 
Meat* 
4.08 
3.86 
3.62 
3.54 
3.48 
3.44 
3.44 
3.41 
3.41 
3.37 
3.26 
3.26 
3.22 
3.16 
3.11 
3.10 
3.09 
3.04 
2.92 
2.39 
The shareholders were also specifically asked the possible reasons for their 
non-participation at AGMs. Table 7 lists some of the reasons. First in the list 
is the fact that the minority shareholders felt that "their equity is too small" to 
be a significant player in the company. This perception was found to be 
consistent with the study conducted by Stiglitz (1985) as well as the 
observations made during the secondary data analysis in Stage One of this 
study. 
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Other reason like "minorities can't out vote dominant block holders" contributed 
to an average score of 3.86. This implies the minority shareholders' perception 
on the significant role and influence of block holders in terms of voting control 
in the meeting room, Indirectly, the minority shareholders felt intimidated and 
refuse to attend or participate actively in the meeting. 
Another important reason was the investors perception that "individual 
shareholders are not cohesive". As a result, they have difficulties to keep 
contact with other shareholders and sometimes they do not know whom they 
are. Further, it is not cost efficient to collect votes and bear on the cost alone. 
In view of such problem, the government effort to form the Minority Shareholder 
Watchdog Group was indeed timely. Such organization may collectively unite 
such votes through proxy initiative in order to take action on their behalf and 
help to protect their interest. 
The minority shareholders also felt that attending the AGM was "too time 
consuming". This finding is consistent with the previous section where it was 
stated that time is important for them to decide whether to attend and participate 
in the meeting. Interestingly, it was also found that, food did not seem to be 
an important reason that hinder them from participating actively in the meetings. 
Other than that, high activism cost is also quoted as an insignificant reason. 
This implies that cost is not the main barrier for them to participate in the 
meeting. This finding is contradictory to some earlier studies (e.g. Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Gillan and Starks, 2000 and Gordon and Pound, 1993). These 
earlier studies had found that, individual shareholders activism is costly, if 
they act alone. But, this cost can be reduced if they unite or appoint a proxy 
that can exercise their voting power (similar to USA or MSWG). 
Investors confidence level with regulatory bodies and agencies which 
involve in protecting their rights 
Although it was not part of the research objective to determine the minority 
shareholders' perception towards regulatory bodies such as the KLSE, 
Securities Commissions, Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB), 
Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA), MSWG, MICG and others, it is useful 
to know their confidence levels. Interestingly, the study found that the 
respondents placed very low impressions on these agencies (all agencies 
had average scores of less than three). It is however a comfort to know that 
new agency such as MSWG receives a relatively favorable perception among 
the minority shareholders in comparison to a more established Companies 
Act. Table 8 depicts the corresponding results. 
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Table 8 : Ranking of confidence level on regulatory bodies and agencies 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Variables 
Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group 
Registrar of companies 
KLSE Listing Requirements 
Securities Commissions 
Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance 
Malaysian code on Corporate Governance 
Malaysian Accounting Standard Board 
Malaysian Institute of Accountant 
Company's Act 1967 
Mean 
2.81 
2.81 
2.75 
2.74 
2.73 
2.71 
2.70 
2.68 
2.68 
Shareholders comments on ways to improve shareholders activism in 
Malaysia 
Some of the meaningful suggestions gathered from the questionnaires include 
providing educational programs and training to enhance investors' knowledge 
on their roles, rights and responsibilities as well as importance of attending 
annual general meeting. Besides that, time and venue of the meeting should 
be convenient to investors. Some investors suggested that the meeting to be 
held during the weekend. Thus, this would encourage investor to attend and 
participate in the meeting. 
Other than that, investors suggested alternative way of voting that is via Internet 
and online meeting to be held in order to increase participation in the companies' 
meeting. Some of the opinions stated that companies should highlight impact 
of resolution on minority shareholders interest. Finally, investors had 
recommended an increase on the minorities' shareholders portion, therefore, 
enable them to have more incentive to participate in the meeting. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Based on the secondary data findings, most companies complied successfully 
in issuing the "Statement of Shareholders Disclosure" which mainly focused 
on majority shareholders information. However, most companies did not view 
that minority shareholding information as significant information to be portrayed 
in annual report. Many companies had no disclosure on this information in 
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their analysis of shareholding statement. This showed that, companies' did 
not see the importance of disclosing the information. 
The questionnaire survey found that minority investors in general are not aware 
of their roles and rights as shareholders. It can be seen from the level of 
knowledge on several issues in relation to companies' background as well as 
shareholders basic roles and rights. 
The findings revealed that minority investors achieved very low knowledge 
scores specifically on companies' ownership structure, companies' policies 
and shareholders roles and rights. These findings may imply that they did not 
realize that they could play a strategic role in corporate governance. The 
responsibility of strengthening corporate governance should not be only relied 
upon directors and auditors. Here, investors or shareholders should take 
part in enhancing corporate governance of the company. Thus, shareholders 
shouldhave basic knowledge on the companies' information especially 
ownership structure, companies' policy making process as well as their basic 
roles and rights to oversee directors to control their misconduct if any. 
As a conclusion, the responsible agencies should enhance shareholder 
awareness of their roles and rights especially with regards to attending the 
annual general meeting as well as exercising their voting rights. Then only, 
shareholder activism can be promoted in this country. Despite that, companies 
should also play a pro-active role by disclosing the minority shareholding 
information in the annual report. This may further enhance corporate 
governance disclosure reporting in this country. 
It is therefore recommended that minority shareholders be formally informed 
of their roles and rights through proper channels. The MSWG, MICG and 
KLSE being the most "trusted" organizations from the investors point of view 
could proactively provide roadshows, seminars, workshops or the like on the 
importance of exercising their rights atAGMs. The investors should be informed 
that they could also effectively exercise their rights by giving their proxy votes 
to MSWG as their agent. 
From the companies' point of view, disclosure on minority shareholding should 
also be portrayed in the annual report. Thus, investors would feel more valuable 
even though their holding is relatively small in comparison to other majority 
shareholders. 
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Future Research 
In the future research, this study can be extended to institutional shareholders 
awareness of roles and rights as shareholders. It is because institutional 
shareholder is major player of shareholders activism that should protect 
minority shareholders interest. Another significant area is the impact of 
shareholders activism on firm's performance or firms' value. Besides that, it 
can also be further expanded to shareholders activism impact on companies' 
policies (for example directors' remuneration policies and directors nomination 
policies). 
Besides that, another area that can be extended in this study is companies' 
corporate governance score to other elements of ownership structure, 
which is concentration, and influence of ownership structure. Concentration 
and influence of ownership structure do not depend solely on companies' 
disclosure practices, but it does require a very detail analysis on other available 
information in order to determine the exact scores for such concentration and 
influence. This is an important area to study since; it reflects the key role of 
monitoring aspect in corporate governance. 
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